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A commentary on
“Cultural recycling of neural substrates during language evolution and development,” in The
Cognitive Neurosciences, 5th Edn.
by Christiansen,M. H., andMüller, R.-A. (2015). edsM. S. Gazzaniga andG. R.Mangun (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press), 675–682.
In their contribution to The Cognitive Neurosciences V, the most recent addition to the popular
series of works of reference among cognitive (neuro-)scientists, Christiansen and Müller (2015)
discuss the role of phylogenetically ancient neural circuits in the evolution of the human language
faculty (FL) and its ontogenetic development from the perspective of what they refer to as
“cultural recycling.” While I am in principle highly sympathetic to any endeavor that addresses
“Darwin’s problem” (Boeckx, 2009) within the conceptual framework of “neural recycling” (e.g.,
Dehaene and Cohen, 2007), it occurs to me that Christiansen and Müller’s outright dismissal of
Universal Grammar (UG) is premature and ill-founded, as they reiterate misconceptions regarding
evolutionary biology and UG that are common in the literature (e.g., Dunbar, 2003; Christiansen
and Chater, 2008; Christiansen et al., 2009; Evans and Levinson, 2009; Chater and Christiansen,
2010).
Christiansen and Müller (2015) rightly call attention to the fact that the evolution of UG, that is
seemingly (highly) arbitrary linguistic principles, by means of natural selection as, for example, put
forward by Pinker and Bloom (1990) actually delineates a next to impossible scenario for human
cognitive phylogeny. Clearly, the arbitrariness of UG principles would constitute a “moving target”
for natural selection, that is a target that could hardly, if at all, have been selected for (Chater et al.,
2009). The authors present this conclusion as evidence against the existence of UG and base their
case for “cultural evolution” on it. Yet, in so doing they fail to fully explore the consequences of this
claim. As Berwick (2009) already pointed out, an independent movement in theoretical linguistics
has come to strikingly similar conclusions and has carried on where Christiansen andMüller (2015)
seemingly chose to leave off.
The assertion that FL did not “evolve” (in a neo-Darwinian sense) might appear somewhat
bizarre at first, but the idea that natural selection is not the only force in evolution was already
acknowledged by Darwin himself (in later editions of Origin of Species) and has been gaining
widespread acceptance among biologists in the last two or so decades (Fodor and Piattelli-
Palmarini, 2010/2011). Along these lines the so-called language as a “spandrel” (Gould and
Lewontin, 1979) scenario has repeatedly and plausibly been put forward in the literature (e.g.,
Hauser et al., 2002; Fitch et al., 2005; Bolhuis et al., 2014). In essence, the argument is that FL,
being universal among humans (Anderson and Lightfoot, 2000; Berwick et al., 2013; Hauser et al.,
2014), arose “recently” and “suddenly” (Tattersall, 2009, 2013), a stance that deems large parts of
FL to be exaptations (Fitch, 2010, 2011).
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Such an exaptationist train of thought seems to me to be, in
principle, highly compatible with Christiansen and Müller’s goal
of painting a picture of FL within the conceptual framework
of neural recycling during phylogeny. In the terminology of
Hauser et al. (2002), the faculty of language in a broad sense
(FLB) should be expected to have inherited properties of the
evolutionary ancient systems of which it is composed so that the
novelty of the narrow language faculty (FLN) might even come
down to nothing else than the way in which it links these ancient
systems together. Thus, the object of interest is the evolution of
language as “[. . . ] a computational cognitive mechanism that has
hierarchical syntactic structure at its core [. . . ]” (Bolhuis et al.,
2014, p. 1). Pressingly, we find that the design of this mechanism
is often ill-suited for communicative purposes, instead adhering
to principles of efficient computation (e.g., Chomsky, 2011).
Because UG cannot have evolved through natural selection
Christiansen and Müller introduce “cultural recycling” of
preexisting neural structures as a supposed alternative. Despite
the authors’ statement that “Without our brains, there would
be no language.” (Christiansen and Müller, 2015, p. 676), they
nevertheless assert that as the brain did not adapt for language,
language(s) instead must have adapted to human brains through
“cultural evolution.” Given that there is no way for an I-language
to “exist” apart from the human mind/brain (Chomsky, 1986),
it is completely unclear how a language that did not “fit” the
human brain could ever have existed (the hypothetical realm
of the theorist’s design space notwithstanding). Consequently,
the “close fit” between language design and the human brain
is, contrary to Christiansen and Müller’s assessment, neither
surprising nor in need of explanation.
As a case in point, given the pace of language change (i.e.,
“cultural evolution”), all properties of language that counteract
communicative efficiency (Christiansen and Müller’s “socio-
pragmatic considerations”) should long have been eliminated if
there was no UG, provided that FL emerged roughly 100,000
years ago (Tattersall, 2009, 2013; Bolhuis et al., 2014). Yet
contrary to Christiansen and Müller’s conjecture this is not the
case. The corresponding conclusion is that natural languages
do not evolve in a (neo-)Darwinian sense, instead they change
(Chomsky, 2011) within a rather narrow framework of possible
variation provided by UG (currently best captured by the
concept of parametric variation; see Baker, 2001). This fixed
framework concerns linguistic features as opposed to their
culturally determined values (Berwick, 2009), a distinction that
the authors fail to make. Thus, accepting that the linguistic
genotype is fixed (Anderson and Lightfoot, 2000; Berwick et al.,
2013; Hauser et al., 2014), as it would seem that Christiansen and
Müller (2015) do, language change becomes irrelevant for the
study of the phylogeny of FL, and the role of “cultural evolution”
is rendered even more obscure.
Christiansen and Müller’s (2015) dismissal of UG in part also
rests upon a discussion of the multiple cognitive functions that
have credibly been localized to Broca’s area (i.e., Brodmann area
44/45), a canonical “language region.” But from an exaptationist
point of view this is not surprising, after all, the evolutionary
change that created FL is conceived as minimal so that we
should expect recycling of the same neural tissue for different
functions. Nevertheless, functional specificity for language has
been demonstrated (Musso et al., 2003; Fedorenko et al., 2011),
and the processing of hierarchical structure as a core linguistic
operation has successfully been isolated from other functions
attributed to Broca’s area, such as working memory (Makuuchi
et al., 2009). Furthermore, observed variability in the neural basis
of the world’s languages is generally highly restricted, whereas
linguistic function (e.g., syntactic, lexico-semantic, etc.) wins
out over form (i.e., encoding) in all known respects (Friederici
and Rüschenmeyer, 2006; Friederici, 2011), even independent of
modality (Emmorey, 2006).
Unfortunately, available neuroimaging methods are not (yet)
capable of capturing minute details with respect to (online)
spatial and temporal resolution (Friederici and Rüschenmeyer,
2006; Kemmerer, 2015). However, everything currently known
about the encoding of information in single neurons and cell
assemblies (Quiroga et al., 2005; Sterling and Laughlin, 2015),
as well as the fundamental principles on which much simpler
nervous systems realize cognitive functions (Gallistel, 2009),
points toward arbitrariness. While coding and computation are
currently best understood in input-systems assigning “some
order to our experience” (Anderson and Lightfoot, 2000, p. 15),
such as the visual system famously studied by Hubel and Wiesel
(1962), there is no reason to suppose that higher cognitive
functions should be an exception. In general, the “atoms”
of neural computation (Marcus et al., 2014) remain largely
unknown and the granularity mismatch problem (Poeppel and
Embick, 2005/2013) pertains, but efforts to ground linguists’
abstractions in neurophysiology are under way (Friederici and
Singer, 2015).
What then to say in conclusion? The idea that UG might
have arisen through the recombination of already existing
neural systems with (highly) arbitrary features from which new
(language-specific) ones could have emerged remains credible
in the light of contemporary neuroscience. The basic premise
of Christiansen and Müller’s (2015) proposed solution for
Darwin’s problem is interesting and fully compatible with
recent independent efforts of theoretical linguists, but as
yet I do not see any reason to throw out the baby with
the bathwater by either dismissing UG or intermingling the
study of language change with the study of the evolution
of FL.
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